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a b s t r a c t
The literature offers several efficient masking methods for providing resistance to side-
channel attacks against iterative block ciphers, such as Data Encryption Standard (DES)
and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). One of the proposed methods is to apply
independent masks to each of the first and last few rounds. However, at the workshops on
Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC) 2006 and Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded
System (CHES) 2007, Handschuh–Preneel and Biryukov–Khovratovich showed that DES
and AES with such reduced masked rounds are still vulnerable to side-channel attacks
combined with block cipher cryptanalysis. Specifically, Handschuh and Preneel presented
differential based side-channel attacks onDESwith the first 4 roundsmasked, andBiryukov
and Khovratovich presented impossible and multiset collision based side-channel attacks
on AESwith the first 2, 3 and 4 rounds masked. More recently, Kim and Hong showed that
AES-192 and AES-256 with the first 5 rounds masked are also vulnerable to side-channel
attacks based on the meet-in-the-middle technique.
In this paper, we focus on the security ofDESwith reducedmasked rounds against side-
channel attacks; we propose differential based side-channel attacks onDESwith the first 5,
6 and 7 roundsmasked: they require 217.4, 224, 235.5 chosen plaintextswith associate power
traces and collision measurements, correspondingly. Our attacks are the first known side-
channel attacks on DES with the first 5, 6 and 7 rounds masked; our attack results show
thatDESwith any reducedmasked rounds is not secure against side-channel attacks, i.e., in
order for DES to be resistant to side-channel attacks, entire rounds should be masked.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Background.While conventional cryptanalytic tools such as differential and linear attacks exploit weaknesses of ciphers
themselves [1,2], side-channel attacks such as differential power analysis and timing analysis work depending on how
ciphers are implemented [3,4]. This implies that security against side-channel attacks does not depend on the ciphers
themselves, but rather on their implementations, as the attacks exploit side-channel information that is garnered from the
cipher’s implementations. Using such side-channel information, the attacker can accumulate knowledge about Hamming
weights or collisions for the intermediate data computed during the enciphering of plaintexts, which may lead in turn to
uncovering secret information about the underlying cipher (e.g., round subkeys). Thus one approach to security is to focus
on how to implement the ciphers in such a way that they can resist side-channel attacks.
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Table 1
Summary of our and previous side-channel attacks on popular block ciphers with reduced masked rounds.
Ciphers Attack method Masked rounds Complexity Comment
Data Time Memory
DES DC 8 219 CP – – [7]
TDC 8 211 CP – – [9]
DC 10 217.4 CP 217.4 – Section 3
DC 12 224 CP 224 – Section 3
DC 14 235.5 CP 235.5 – Section 4
AES-192 Simple 4 26– 27 CP 27 – [8]
IC 6 219– 220 CP 227 – [8]
AES-256 MultiSet 8 232 CP 244.5 – [8]
MitM 8 234+m CP 280.4−n + 246.4+n 277−n [10]
MitM 10 234+m CP 2208.4−n + 246.4+n 2205−n [10]
CP: Chosen plaintexts with their power traces; DC: Differential Cryptanalysis, TDC: Truncated DC, IC: Impossible Collision; MitM: Meet-in-the-Middle,
Time: encryption unit;m = 0 if n ≤ 22,m = dn− 22e otherwise; nmasked rounds represent the first n/2 and the last n/2 masked rounds.1
The best known countermeasure against side-channel attacks is to randomize intermediate values over the cipher
by masking each of its rounds. A disadvantage of this approach is that masking all the rounds of the cipher has a high
implementation cost: for instance, the implementation of masked AES requires about 50 times as many computations as
unmasked AES, or about 64 KB ROM for keeping precomputed masked tables. To overcome the disadvantage of the full-
roundmaskingmethod, several researchers have suggestedmasking the first and last few rounds of the ciphers, as it has been
claimed that such reduced-roundmasking is sufficient to provide resistance against side-channel attacks [5,6]. However, for
DES and AES, several reduced-round masking methods are known to be vulnerable to the side-channel approach through
the Handschuh–Preneel attacks [7], Biryukov–Khovratovich attacks [8], Gang et al.’s attacks [9] and Kim–Hong attacks [10].
Relatedwork. In [7] Handschuh and Preneel presented differential based side-channel attacks onDESwith the first 4 rounds
masked which had been proposed by Akkar et al. in [6]. (The full description of the cipher proposed in [6] is to mask the first
4 and the last 4 rounds only.) Handschuh and Preneel showed that their attack needed about 219 chosen plaintextswith their
associate power traces and Hamming weight measurements to recover the master key. Furthermore, Gang et al. improved
the Handschuh and Preneel attacks from 219 to 211 in the data complexity, by using truncated differentials [9].
As noted above, it is possible for the side-channel attacker to knowwhether intermediate bytes or words computed from
two different plaintexts are equal, and this is the basis of the attacks in [8]. In that work Biryukov–Khovratovich presented
impossible andmultiset collision based side-channel attacks on AESwith the first 2, 3, and 4 rounds masked, which require
about 26–27, 219–220 and 232 chosen plaintexts with their associate power traces and collisionmeasurements to recover the
master key, correspondingly.
More recently, Kim and Hong introduced a side-channel attack using the meet-in-the-middle technique [10]. Using
the newly proposed side-channel attack they succeeded in devising a full-key recovery attack on AES-192 and AES-256
with the first 5 rounds masked; it requires 292 chosen plaintexts with their associate power traces and Hamming weight
measurements.
Motivation. So far there have been no side-channel attacks on DES with more than 9 reduced masked rounds. The
Handschuh–Preneel and Gang et al.’s attacks on DES with the first 4 rounds masked do not guarantee that DES needs a
full-round masking to be resistant to side-channel attacks. Is DES secure against side-channel attacks if DES does not have
masks for the entire rounds? This question is the motivation to initiating this paper. This paper gives the answer.
Contribution. In this paper, we propose differential based side-channel attacks on DES with the first 5, 6 and 7 rounds
masked: they requires 217.4, 224, 235.5 chosen plaintexts with their associate power traces and collision measurements,
correspondingly, which are all verified by our C programming. See Table 1 for more detailed results for our and previous
side-channel attacks onDES andAESwith reducedmasked rounds. Our attacks imply that in practice one can easily recover
the key information from the implementation ofDESwith any reducedmasked rounds, and thus it can lead to security threat
to applications embedding such DES implementation. As a result of our attacks, DES with any reduced masked rounds is
not secure against side-channel attacks, i.e., in order for DES to be resistant to side-channel attacks, entire rounds should be
masked.
Organization. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief description of DES is given. In Sections 3 and
4, we present differential based side-channel attacks on DES with the first 5, 6 and 7 rounds masked. Finally, Section 5
concludes this paper.
1 Note that if one has a side-channel attack on DES with the first n/2 rounds masked under the chosen plaintext attack scenario (n :even), then he can
succeed in devising a side-channel attack on DESwith the last n/2 rounds masked chosen ciphertext attack scenario.
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Table 2
Possible input pairs of 0010002 → 10102 by s2 .
0000102 0010102 1000002 1010002 0100012 0110012 1001002 1011002
0001102 0011102 1000102 1010102 0101012 0111012 1001102 1011102
2. A description of DES
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) [11], which was designed by a team at IBM, had been a federal encryption standard
(from 1976) before it was superseded by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [12] in the early 2000’s. The cipher DES
is a 16-round Feistel network with 64-bit blocks and 56-bit keys, for which the right half of the computed data is only
encrypted through each round function F :
IP(P) = L0 ‖ R0,
Li+1 = Ri and Ri+1 = Li ⊕ F(Ri) for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15,
IP−1(R16 ‖ L16) = C,
where P and C are 64-bit plaintext and ciphertext each, and IP is the initial permutation (note that the last round does not
apply the halves to be swapped). The round function F is made up of the following four basic transformations:
• The E expansion is a linear mapping from 32 bits into 48 bits.
• The subkey addition is the XOR between a 48-bit subkey and a 48-bit encrypted data after the E expansion.
• The nonlinear substitution applies different eight S-boxes mapping from 6 bits into 4 bits each.
• The P permutation is a bit-wise transposition.
For more details of the above four transformations, refer to [11]. We omit the DES key schedule, as it does not affect
much on our attacks.
3. Differential based side-channel attacks on DESwith the first 5 and 6 reduced masked rounds
In this section, we introduce differential based side-channel attacks on DESwith the first 5 and 6 roundsmasked.We use
5 and 6-round differential characteristics in presented [1]. In our attacks, we assume that the side-channel attacker knows
whether intermediate bytes or words in unmasked rounds, computed from two different plaintexts, are equal or not.
3.1. Attack on DES with the first 5 reduced masked rounds
The basic idea behind our attack is to exploit the fact that if the plaintext difference is 40 5C 00 00 04 00 00 00x, the output
difference of the 5th round is 40 5C 00 00 04 00 00 00x with probability 2−13.4. See Fig. 1 (this differential characteristic was
introduced in [1]).2 Our attack recovers 6-bit subkey information of the 1st round entering into the second S-box s2 using
this differential characteristic.
If the input difference of the round function F in the 6th round is 40 5C 00 00x, the difference at the output position of the
E expansion is 0010002 0000002 0010112 1110002 0000002 0000002 0000002 0000002 (see Fig. 2). It follows that we can filter
out wrong pairs with probability 2−24 using the 30-bit collision restriction at the 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th output positions of
the E expansion (note that the last 2 bits of the ith output position, and the first 2 bits of the (i + 1)th output position are
same (i = 5, 6, 7)). If we use 216.4 plaintext pairs which satisfy the plaintext difference 40 5C 00 00 04 00 00 00x, all thewrong
pairs are expected to be filtered out as our filtering rate is 2−24.
In order to recover 6-bit subkey information of the 1st round entering into the second S-box s2, we analyze the
differential distribution table for the s2 box. There are 16 possible pairs with respect to the input difference 0010002
and the output difference 10102. Table 2 shows all the possible input pairs of 0010002 → 10102 by s2. In other
words, we obtain 16 key candidates corresponding to the s2 box in the first round for each right pair (note that
E (04 00 00 00x) = 0000002 0010002 0000002 0000002 0000002 0000002 0000002 0000002 and P (00002 10102 00002
00002 00002 00002 00002 00002) = 40 08 00 00x; see Fig. 3). We can recover the right key which has maximal hits as follows.
1. Collect 216.4 plaintext pairs with difference 40 5C 00 00 04 00 00 00x and encrypt them with DES with the first five and
the last five masked rounds.
2. For each plaintext pair, collect its power traces during the encryption process and check the collision at the input position
of the s2, s5, s6, s7 and s8 boxes for the 6th round. If collision does not happen, the corresponding plaintext pair is
discarded.
2 The intermediate differences of the 5-round differential characteristic will be altered depending on masking values, however the first input and the
output differences of the 5-round differential characteristic will be consistent regardless of the masking values, as the 5 rounds are only masked.
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Fig. 1. 5-round differential characteristic of DES.
Fig. 2. Filtering positions in the 6th round.
Fig. 3. Active S-box in the 1st round.
3. Consider plaintext pairs passing the above test as right pairs to follow the 5-round differential characteristic, and analyze
the s2 box of the 1st round with remaining the plaintext pairs; this analysis is performed by using the difference
distribution table of the s2 box, which suggests key candidates for the 6-bit subkey entering into the s2 box.
4. Output the keys with maximal hits in step 3.
Since the 5-round differential characteristic holdswith probability 2−13.4, about 8 out of 216.4 plaintext pairs are expected
to be right pairs, which implies that the right subkey K is expected to be suggested 8 times in step 3.
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Fig. 4. 6-round differential characteristic of DES.
Howmany hits are expected by wrong keys? As stated above, the filtering rate of step 3 is 2−24, so the expected number
of wrong pairs to survive even after our filtering is 0. Let a set R be 16 possible pairs in Table 2, and we define a · R as
{a⊕ s|s ∈ R}. Then, R = 08x · R = 04x · R = 0Cx · R. It implies that 4 keys K , K ⊕ 08x, K ⊕ 04x and K ⊕ 0Cx have always same
hits, where K is any key candidate. Moreover, any right pairs following the 5-round differential characteristic, 36 out of 64
key candidates are never suggested in step 3. Thus, 36 wrong keys have always 0 hit and the other 24 wrong subkeys which
do not include 4 equivalent right keys are expected to be ((16 · t)− (4 · t))/24 hits, where t is the number of the right pairs
(we assume that all wrong pairs are filtered out in step 2). In our attack, t is expected to be 8, and thus each wrong subkey
has 96/24 = 4 hits on average.
In order to check our attack, we have performed 1000 simulations, where we have used a randomly chosen key and
randomly chosen 216.4plaintext pairs in each execution; 945 executions output 4 key candidates including the right key in
step 4. It follows that the success rate of our attack is almost 1 (our attack finds 4-bit key information).
As stated above, the data complexity of this attack is about 217.4 chosen plaintexts. The time complexity of this attack is
analyzed as follows: in step 2, we need 217.4 measurements and 216.4 curve comparisons, and the computation of step 3 is
negligible. Thus, the total time complexity is approximately 217.4 measurements.
3.2. Attack on DES with the first 6 reduced masked rounds
In this subsection, we introduce an attack on DES with the first 6 reduced masked rounds. This attack is very similar
to the above attack. We use 6-round differential characteristic which is extended from the above 5-round differential
characteristic; one round differential is attached at the front of the 5-round differential characteristic. If the plaintext
difference is 84 41 13 46 40 5C 00 00x, the output difference of the 1st round is 40 5C 00 00 04 00 00 00x with probability
2−6.6. It implies that the input difference of the 7th round is 04 00 00 00 40 5C 00 00x with probability 2−20 (see Fig. 4; the
extended 6-round differential characteristic was introduced in [1]).
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Using the same filtering process of the above attack, we can filter out the wrong pairs with probability 2−24. In order to
obtain 8 right pairs, we use about 223 chosen plaintext pairs.
Since s1, s3 and s4 are active in the 1st round, we can recover 18-bit subkeys corresponding to these S-boxes using the
differential distribution tables for the s1, s3 and s4. Similarly to the above analysis for s2, 12, 14 and 16 key candidates are
suggested corresponding from s1, s3 and s4 for each plaintext pair. Moreover, s1, s3 and s4 have 2, 2 and 16 equivalent keys,
respectively. Thus, we obtain the 12 (= 5+ 5+ 2)− bit key information using s1, s3 and s4 of the first round.
The attack procedure is as follows:
1. Collect 223 plaintext pairs with difference 84 41 13 46 40 5C 00 00x and encrypt them with DES with the first 6 and the
last 6 masked rounds.
2. For each plaintext pair, collect its power traces during the encryption process and check the collision at the input position
of the s2, s5, s6, s7 and s8 box for the 7th round. If collision does not happen, the corresponding plaintext pair is discarded.
3. Consider plaintext pairs passing the above test as right pairs to follow the 6-round differential characteristic, and analyze
the s1 box of the 1st round with remaining the plaintext pairs; this analysis is performed by using the difference
distribution table of s1 box, which suggests key candidates for the 6-bit subkey entering into the s1 box. Apply s3 and
s4 to this procedure.
4. Output each 6-bit keys with maximal hit in step 3.
Similarly to the above attack, about 8 out of 223 plaintext pairs are expected to be right pairs, which implies that the right
subkey K is expected to be suggested 8 times in step 3.
Since the filtering rate of step 3 is 2−24, the expected number of the wrong pairs to survive even after our filtering is 0.5.
In the case of s1, 32 out of 64 possible key candidates are suggested in step 3 for any right pairs. Thus, a wrong subkey has
((12 · t)− (2 · t))/30+ (12 · s)/32 hits on average, where t means the number of the right pairs and smeans the number
of the wrong pairs to survive even after our filtering (the number of the possible suggested keys is 32, and the number of
the equivalent keys is 2). In our attack, t = 8 and s = 0.5, and thus each wrong key is expected to be 2.86 hits. In the case
of s3 and s4, the wrong subkeys are expected to have 2.86 and 0.5 hits, respectively, while the right equivalent subkeys are
expected to have 8 hits.
In order to check our attack, we have also performed 1000 simulations, where we have used a randomly chosen key and
randomly chosen 223plaintext pairs in each execution: 50, 73 and 2 out of 1000 executions output more than 2, 2 and 16
key candidates corresponding to s1, s3 and s4, respectively (the other executions output 2,2 and 16 key candidates including
6-bit right keys). However, the 6-bit right keys are always included in the set of outputted keys. So, we always obtain the
information of the key; it means that the success rate of our attack is about 1. Moreover, the number of right pairs which
pass our filtering is average 8.73 on average and the number of wrong pair to survive even after our filtering is about 0.52
on average.
As stated above, the data complexity of this attack is about 224.0 chosen plaintexts. The time complexity of this attack
is analyzed as follows: in step 2, we need 224 measurements and 223.0 curve comparisons. The computation of step 3 is
negligible. Thus total time complexity is approximately 224.0 measurements.
4. Differential based side-channel attack on DESwith the first 7 reduced masked rounds
In this section, we propose a differential based side-channel attack on DES with the first 7 reduced masked rounds.
In [1], a 2-round iterative differential characteristic with probability 1234 was introduced. We construct 7-round differential
characteristic with probability 2−31.5 by applying this 2-round iterative differential characteristic three and half times. Here,
the input difference and the output difference of the 7-round differential characteristic are both 00 00 00 00 19 60 00 00x (see
Fig. 5).
In the case of the right pairs, the 32-bit input difference of the F function in the 8th round is 0. Thus, we can filter
out the wrong pairs with probability 2−32. Moreover, we can additionally use a filtering for the 32-bit input difference of
the F function in 9th round. Since this difference is 19 60 00 00x, the difference at the output position of the E expansion is
0000112 1100102 1011002 0000002 0000002 0000002 0000002 0000002. Thus, we can filter out thewrong pairs with probability
2−22 using the 30-bit collision at the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th output positions of the E expansion (see Fig. 6). Therefore,
the filtering rate of our attack is 2−54.
Similarly to the above attacks, we can recover 18-bit subkey entering into the three active S-boxes, s1, s2 and s3, in the
first round. According to the distribution tables of the s1, s2 and s3, for each pair, there exist 14, 8 and 10 key candidates
corresponding to s1, s2 and s3, respectively. Moreover, there exist 2 equivalent keys for s1, s2 and s3 each. It implies that we
can obtain the 15-bit key information.
The attack procedure is as follows:
1. Collect 234.5 plaintext pairs with difference 00 00 00 00 19 60 00 00x and encrypt them with DES with the first 7 and the
last 7 masked rounds.
2. For each plaintext pair, collect the power traces during the encryption process and check the collision at the right half
input position of the 8th round input position. If collision does not happen, the corresponding plaintext pair is discarded.
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Fig. 5. 7-round differential characteristic of DES.
3. For the remaining plaintext pairs, check the collision at the input positions of the s4, s5, s6, s7 and s8 boxes for the 9th
round. If collision does not happen, the corresponding plaintext pair is discarded.
4. Analyze the s1 box of the first roundwith the plaintext pairswhich are passed by the above test; this analysis is performed
by using the difference distribution table of the s1 box, which suggests key candidates for the 6-bit subkey entering into
the s1 box. Apply s2 and s3 to this procedure.
5. Output each 6-bit keys with maximal hit in step 4.
Since we use 234.5 chosen plaintext pairs, about 8 plaintext pairs are expected to be right pairs. It implies that the right
subkey K is expected to be suggested 8 times in step 4.
The expected number of the wrong pairs to survive even after our filtering in step 2 and 3 is almost 0. So, we can
calculate the number of hits in step 4 by using similar method in Section 3. In the case of s1, each wrong subkey has
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Fig. 6. Filtering positions in the 8th round and the 9th round.
2.29 = ((14 · t) − (2 · t))/42 hits on average (the number of the possible suggested keys is 42 and the number of the
equivalent keys is 2). Similarly, each wrong subkeys are expected to have about 4 and 0.52 hits corresponding to s2 and s3,
respectively.
For checking our attack, we have performed 70 simulations. 9 executions fail to recover the right equivalent keys, and
36, 30 and 43 out of 61 executions output more than 2 key candidates (including the equivalent right keys) of s1, s3 and s4,
respectively (the other executions output 2 key candidates including 6-bit right keys). Thus, the success rate of our attack is
about 0.87.
The data complexity of this attack is about 235.5 chosen plaintexts. The time complexity of this attack is analyzed as
follows: in step 2, we need 235.5measurements and 234.5 curve comparisons and the computation of step 3 is also negligible.
Thus, the total time complexity is approximately 235.5 measurements.
The result of this attack on DES with the first 7 reduced masked rounds implies that DES with reduced masked rounds
is vulnerable to side-channel attacks, i.e., masking full rounds is needed to prevent side-channel attacks.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed differential based side-channel attacks on DESwith the first 5, 6 and 7 rounds masked:
they require 217.4, 224, 235.5 chosen plaintexts with their associate power traces and collision measurements. They are the
first known practical side-channel attacks on DESwith the first 5, 6 and 7 rounds masked, which have been verified by our
simulations. Our results show that DES with any reduced rounds masked is vulnerable to side-channel attacks. Therefore,
in order to protect DES from side-channel attacks, one should mask all the rounds.
In the sequel to this paper, it would be interesting to investigate if there exist other types of block cipher cryptanalyses
to devise better attacks than ours, and if the method developed in the paper is also applicable to other known ciphers with
reduced masked rounds, especially to AES.
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